Katakata go bust again

I have recently been working on a research project dealing with the Niger Delta Conflict, analyzing its root causes, the history, and its impacts. Originally it was planned that I would be involved in writing a short article about the Niger Delta Amnesty, but I am not sure whether I will be able to finish my part before I am leaving. However, the point is that my boss wanted to report "positive news" from Nigeria, he wanted to portray the amnesty as a success, showing that certain things change for the better. The amnesty ran from August 6th until October 4th and militant leaders of the Niger Delta region were asked to hand over their arms in exchange for money. With 15,000 militants reportedly officially surrendered and thousands of weapons including 2,760 assorted guns, 287,445 ammunitions of different calibre, 18 gun-boats, 763 dynamites, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and several other military accessories like dynamite cables, bullet proof jackets and jack-knives recovered at the expiration of the presidential amnesty, progress has undoubtedly been made in restoring peace in the region. After the last failed attempt at implementing an amnesty programme in 2004, this is definitely considered to be good news. But it is only half of the story.

The Niger Delta conflict is an ongoing crisis that evolved with the discovery of petroleum in the Southern region of Nigeria as early as 1957. The roots of the Niger Delta conflict lie in the history of struggles for self-determination, local autonomy and democracy of ethnic minorities in the region; a combination of numerous regional and ethnic conflicts makes up the "Niger Delta Crisis", which has also been said to be the "Nigerian Crisis", as it is of major economic and political consequence. The Niger Delta region contributes the economic lifeline and fiscal basis of the Nigerian state, petroleum, while at the same time the region is among the poorest within Nigeria. Local communities lack basic infrastructure, electricity and piped water; furthermore their indigeneous land is polluted through daily oil spills and gas flaring. Oil exploration is the only noteworthy economic activity that is carried out in the region and it has replaced agriculture, which has been the main source of living and employment. Only a tiny fraction of locals is employed in the oil sector, most people are unemployed and face poverty and the daily struggle for survival. Local communities feel exploited and neglected, as they do not receive an adequate share of the oil wealth, while at the same time their basis of living has been taken away.

Armed militias have emerged in the early 1990s, after previous peaceful attempts at resolving the crisis by local people have been brutally put down by the Nigerian military. Several conflicts, such as the case of Ogoniland, and the execution of nine Ogoni leaders, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, or the Warri crisis and the Odi massacre, have been met with military force by the federal government; in many cases their proceedings can only be described as open terrorism against their own people. In May 2009 a full-scale offensive by Nigerian forces has been launched, thousands of civilians have fled, villages have been destroyed. The federal government meets the actions of militant groups with force. Nevertheless, local militant groups have succeeded in cutting Nigeria's oil output by a third, through the demolition and damage of oil-infrastructure. Economically, the conflict is costing billions each year; politically it implies the separation of one group of people from the rest of the country, a group that feels strongly neglected, exploited, and increasingly separated from the Nigerian state.

The amnesty has been partially successful, arms and weapons have been handed over, groups have de-militarized. Nevertheless, the question remains: What happens now? There does not seem to be a "post-conflict plan", an agenda for sustainable peace in the region. The amnesty was a first step, but the following steps are not quite figured out yet. MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigeri Delta), which materialized in 2006 and has been one of the most aggressive and heavily armed groupings, drawing members from all different ethnic groups has not taken part in the laying down of arms. Thus, a substantial amount of weapons (and the people willing to use them) are still out there. MEND is not afraid of more extreme measures, such as the kidnapping of foreign oil workers and attacks on oil transports via speedboats. No sufficient solution has been found, apart from more or less empty promises at "improving the situation of the people". A long-term agenda for the Niger Delta is needed urgently; a strategy that will help the people of the Niger Delta to again trust their government. A different pattern of redistribution of oil income has to be found, as well as an economic alternative for the people, aimed at reducing poverty and unemployment. The ruthless destruction of the environment has to be stopped. The amnesty by itself will not solve all these problems, but so far there has not been a comprehensive strategy of the Yar' Adua administration.

Whatever you want to call it: a resource control war, a liberation war, or a protest war, it has to be met by a holistic answer to the striking issues of the Delta. The amnesty can be considered a first step into the right direction, but what is clearly lacking is a long-term strategy of how to translate the ceasefire into lasting peace. Post-amnesty consultations are to be carried out, but many questions remain unanswered: who will negotiate in the name of the people of the Niger Delta? What are the implications of MEND's dismissal of the amnesty offer? How can the situation be improved and what are the challenges and how can they be overcome? Can there be a fair distribution of oil revenues?

The Niger Delta conflict is part of a more general crisis of the Nigerian state, including the lack of responsiveness of the government, a sense of alienation from the state, and the unwillingness of politicians to carry out vital reforms. Fully solving the Niger Delta crisis requires adressing these general issues; not exactly a task I see to be carried out by the current (or any other possible) government.